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Multi-user Multi-Keyword Rank Search over
Encrypted Data in Arbitrary Language
Yang Yang, Member, IEEE, Ximeng Liu, Member, IEEE, Robert H. Deng, Fellow, IEEE,
Abstract—Multi-keyword rank searchable encryption (MRSE)
returns the top-k results in response to a data user’s request of
multi-keyword search over encrypted data, and hence provides
an efficient way for preserving data privacy in cloud storage
systems while without loss of data usability. Many existing
MRSE systems are constructed based on an algorithm which we
term as k-nearest neighbor for searchable encryption (KNN-SE).
Unfortunately, KNN-SE has a number of shortcomings which
limit its practical applications. In this paper, we propose a new
MRSE system which overcomes almost all the defects of the
KNN-SE based MRSE systems. Specifically, our new system does
not require a predefined keyword set and supports keywords
in arbitrary languages, is a multi-user system which supports
flexible search authorization and time-controlled revocation, and
it achieves better data privacy protection since even the cloud
server is not able to tell which documents are the top-k results
returned to a data user. We also conduct extensive experiments
to demonstrate the efficiency of the new system.
Index Terms—searchable encryption, multiple keyword, rank,
top-k, privacy-preserving.
I. INTRODUCTION
CLOUD computing [1] provides virtually unlimited com-putational and storage resources and has attracted in-
creasing number of individuals and corporations to migrate
their data into the cloud. The data privacy concerns the cloud
computing brings along with it [2], [3] inspire cloud users to
encrypt their sensitive documents before they are outsourced
to cloud. Encryption translates data into unreadable ciphertext
and how to search over and share encrypted data have been a
challenging research problem. Searchable encryption (SE) [4],
[5], [6] has been proposed as an effective method to execute
keyword search over encrypted data. To make an encrypted
document searchable in SE, a data owner firstly extracts a
set of keywords from the document and encrypts them into
an encrypted index. Then, the data owner uploads both the
encrypted index and the encrypted document to the cloud for
storage. In the data query phase, a data user creates a keyword
token and submits the token to the cloud. The cloud uses a
matching algorithm to test the association between the search
token and encrypted indices. Then, the encrypted documents
with matching keywords are returned to the data user.
Many efforts have been spent to study SE systems in diverse
application scenarios, such as health care [7], [8], smart grid
[9], internet of things [10]. Many of these SE systems only
support single keyword search [11], [12] or simple conjunctive
queries [13], [14], [15], [16], and are not able to rank searched
documents according to some predefined relevance score.
To provide an improved search experience, the multi-
keyword rank searchable encryption (MRSE) mechanism is
proposed [28], [29], [30], [32] which allows the cloud to return
the top-k results (with the k highest relevance scores) rather
than all relevant documents. However, most of the existing
MRSE systems are based on a special k-nearest neighbor
(KNN) algorithm [28] which we will refer to as k-nearest
neighbor algorithm for searchable encrytion (KNN-SE) during
the rest of the paper. Unfortunately, as we will show in the
paper, KNN-SE and hence the existing MRSE systems based
on it suffer from many shortcomings which greatly limit their
practical applications. It is necessary to design new MRSE
systems to overcome these defects without loss of efficiency
and security.
A. Related Work
The concept of secure search over encrypted data was
firstly proposed by Song et al. [17] in 2000. Curmola et
al. [18] proposed a searchable symmetric encryption (SSE)
scheme to secure storage system. Cash et al. [19] suggested a
scalable SSE scheme supporting boolean query. Liu et al. [20]
utilized the SSE and attribute based encryption to securely
share and search for real-time video data. Yang et al. [21]
proposed a non-interactive order-preserving encryption scheme
to search over encrypted database system, which supports
range search. Zuo et al. [22] designed a SSE scheme to realize
boolean search in secure database, which has higher efficiency
compared with Cash’s scheme [19]. Sun et al. [23] suggested
a multi-client SSE system with support for boolean queries,
which prevents the pre-query interaction between data owners
and users. Kermanshahi et al. [24] also proposed a multi-
user SSE scheme, which is constructed based on the oblivious
cross tags protocol. Boneh et al. [25] put forth a public key
encryption with keyword search scheme. Liang et al. [26]
utilized the proxy re-encryption mechanism to design a public
key searchable encryption scheme, and then they constructed
a regular language search scheme over encrypted cloud data
[27].
In 2011, Cao et al. [28] proposed the first framework of
single-user MRSE based on KNN-SE. KNN-SE is a symmetric
encryption system which utilizes “inner product similarity” to
quantify the similarity and sort the result. A secret key in
KNN-SE consists of two k×k matrices M1,M2 and a vector
S ∈ {0, 1}k, where k is the number of predefined keywords in
the system. For each file, the extracted keywords are mapped
to a vector I ∈ {0, 1}k such that each bit indicates whether a
predefined keyword is in the file. Then, the vector I is split
into two vectors I ′, I ′′ controlled by vector S. Finally, I ′, I ′′
is multiplied by M>1 and M
>
2 , respectively, to generate an
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encrypted index. The trapdoor generation is similar to the
encrypted index except that the split query vector is multiplied
with M−11 and M
−1
2 . In the search phase, dot product is
utilized to calculate the relevance score. (A brief overview
of KNN-SE is given in Supplemental Materials A. The reader
may refer to [28], [38] for more details.)
Since the publication of [28], most of the follow-on MRSE
systems are constructed based on the KNN-SE approach. Yu
et al. [29] put forth a two round searchable encryption system
to realize top-k multi-keyword search. They employ KNN-SE
(whcih is refereed to as the vector space model in [29]) and
order preserving encryption techniques to improve the security.
Fu et al. [30] suggested a multi-keyword rank search system
supporting synonym query based on KNN-SE. It enables
synonym queries such that the possible synonym substitution
can be tolerated in the data retrieval process. In [30], TF-IDF
(term frequency-inverse document frequency) is leveraged in
keyword extraction procedure. A data owner has to build an
index tree to accelerate the search algorithm, which consumes
more storage space. Later on, they proposed a verifiable key-
word based semantic search system over encrypted data [31],
which supports the verifiability of search result. They designed
a symbol-based index tree to store the “path” information. The
search result can be verified using this tree.
Sun et al. [32] also propose a verifiable searchable encryp-
tion system to support multi-keyword search and similarity-
based ranking. They utilize tree-based index structure, multi-
dimension algorithm and KNN-SE to improve the search effi-
ciency. Li et al. [33] integrate the KNN-SE and blind storage
methods to construct an MRSE with blind storage. Then,
they [34], [35] utilize superincreasing sequence to construct
a new MRSE system supporting boolean keyword query, such
as “AND”, “OR” and “NO” operations. They also leverage
classified sub-dictionaries method to achieve better efficiency.
Xia et al. [36] design a special tree-based index structure and
a “greedy depth-first search” algorithm to enhance the search
efficiency. They also used KNN-SE algorithm to encrypt the
index and query.
Chen et al. [37] construct a hierarchical clustering method
to enable more search semantics. Based on the minimum
relevance threshold, the hierarchical method clusters
encrypted documents and partitions the resulting clusters into
sub-clusters. In that way, they achieve better search speed. Fu
et al. [38] use locality sensitive hash function, Bloom filter
and KNN-SE to realize a multi-keyword fuzzy searchable
encryption system.
Although a lot of the MRSE systems are built based on
the KNN-SE algorithm, the algorithm actually has several
obvious limitations. Firstly, KNN-SE requires a predefined
keyword set at the system setup phase and the entire system
need to be rebuilt in order to add any new keywords into
the system. Secondly, KNN-SE is a symmetric key encryption
system and hence a data owner has to disclose his secret
key to a data user in order to authorize the latter query and
decryption privileges and the authorization can not be revoked
even if the authorized data user is found behaving maliciously.
Thirdly, it’s impossible for KNN-SE based MRSE systems
to support keyword search in arbitrary languages since the
number of keywords and hence the dimensions of the matrices
M1 and M2 will be astronomical in order to supports all
keywords in all languages. Fourth, the relevance scores of
the documents are in plaintext and the cloud server could
learn the statistic information of data, such as which are the
high relevant documents and the high-frequency returned files.
These information will leak user’s privacy.
This brief defects analysis of KNN-SE brings us a simple
conclusion: existing MRSE systems based on KNN-SE are not
suitable for practical applications.
B. Contributions
In this paper we propose a new MRSE system which over-
comes all the limitations of the KNN-SE based MRSE systems
while without loss of efficiency and security. In particular, our
new MRSE enjoys the following desirable properties.
• No need for pre-defined keywords. The new system does
not require a set of pre-define keywords during the setup
phase and new keywords can be added any time during
the system operation.
• Support arbitrary language. We use Unicode [48] to
encode keywords in arbitrary languages and utilize an
efficient way to transform them into encrypted ciphertext.
• Flexible authorization and time-controlled revocation.
The system allows a data owner to authorize a data user
the search and decryption privileges in a specified period
of time. When the current time is out of the defined time
period, the right will be revoked automatically. Moreover,
the system also provides the data owner an effective way
to deprive the authorized privileges within a time period.
• Simultaneously search on multi-owner’s data. A data
user can simultaneously search on multiple data owner’s
encrypted documents. For instance, a medical doctor can
simultaneously search over encrypted medical records
produced by different clinics. The other existing search-
able encryption schemes have to generate different trap-
doors to search over different data owner’s documents.
While, our scheme could use only one trapdoor to search
on multiple owners’ data.
• Flexible keyword weight and preference setting. In the
encryption phase, a data owner can set different keyword
weights according to the importance of these keywords.
In the query phase, a data user can search on multiple
keywords and set different preference scores for each
keyword. In the search phase, a cloud server can compute
the relevance scores in encrypted form according to the
keyword weight and preference scores and returns top-k
results to the data user.
• Security and Efficiency. In the existing MRSE systems,
the server is able to learn the plaintext of relevance scores
of each searched document. A cloud server lerans which
documents are the most relevant. In our system, the cloud
server learns nothing from the search results since the
relevance scores returned to data user are encrypted. We
prove the security of this system and conduct extensive
simulations to demonstrate its efficiency.
1545-5971 (c) 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TDSC.2017.2787588, IEEE
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING 3
#
'DWDRZQHU
&ORXG
SODWIRUP&3
&RPSXWDWLRQ
VHUYLFH
SURYLGHU&63
.H\JHQHUDWLRQ
FHQWUH.*&
#
'DWDXVHU
1
B
2
B
2
m
B
1
A
2
A
1
m
A
SXEOLFVHFUHWNH\ SXEOLFVHFUHWNH\
SDUWLDOVWURQJ
VHFUHWNH\
SDUWLDOVWURQJ
VHFUHWNH\
VHDUFKDXWKRUL]DWLRQ
HQFU\SWHGILOH
HQFU\SWHGNH\ZRUGV
HQFU\SWHGNH\ZRUGZHLJKWV
HQFU\SWHGNH\ZRUGV
HQFU\SWHGSUHIHUHQFHVFRUH
WRSNHQFU\SWHGUHVXOWV
GHFU\SWLRQ
Fig. 1: System Model
II. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND SECURITY MODEL
A. System Model
The system shown in Figure 1 consists of five entities.
• Key generation center (KGC) is trusted by all entities in
the system, who is responsible to generate keys for each
entities in the system.
• Cloud platform (CP) has powerful storage and computa-
tion abilities and stores user’s files in an encrypted form.
CP also responds on users’ computation and data retrieval
requests.
• Computing service provider (CSP) is an online computa-
tion server and processes strong calculational capabilities.
It executes interactive computations with CP.
• Data owner. Data owner encrypts his documents and
outsources them to CP.
• Data user. Data user generates a keyword trapdoor to
issue data retrieval request to CP.
B. Attack Model
We follow the attack model in [42], [43], in which KGC
is a fully trusted entity, and CP and CSP are “honest-but-
curious” who are honest to execute the protocols but curious
with the plaintext of user data. An adversary A∗ is defined in
this attack model, whose purpose is to recover the plaintext
of data owner’s privacy-preserving documents and data user’s
retrieved results. A∗ has the following abilities.
(1) A∗ could eavesdrop all communications to get the
transmitted information.
(2) A∗ could compromise CP and try to get the plaintext
from the encrypted information sent by the data owner
and CSP.
(3) A∗ could compromise CSP and try to obtain the plaintext
from the ciphertext sent by CP in interactive protocol.
(4) A∗ could compromise a set of data users (except the
challenge user) and get their privileges. A∗ wants to get
the plaintext information that belong to the challenge
user.
However, the attacker A∗ is not allowed to compromise: (1)
CP and CSP simultaneously, (2) the challenge user. These are
typical restrictions in cryptographic protocols [44].
C. Security Model
The security model in [45], [46] is adopted in this
work. Consider three parties: system user (a.k.a “D1”), CP
(a.k.a “S1”) and CSP (a.k.a “S2”), where system user in-
cludes data owner and user. We construct three simula-
tors (SimD1 , SimS1 , SimS2) against three types of attackers
(AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) that corrupt D1, S1 and S2, respectively.
These attackers are deemed as non-colluding and semi-honest.
Due to the length limitation, please refer to [40], [45], [46]
for the general security model definitions.
III. CRYPTO PRIMITIVES AND PROTOCOLS
A. Paillier Cryptosystem with Threshold Decryption
The Paillier cryptosystem [39] with threshold decryption
(PCTD) in [40], [41] is utilized for data encryption and could
prevent the private key leakage risk in this paper. Let L(X)
denote the bit length of X .
KeyGen: Let k be the security parameter and p, q be two
large prime numbers such that L(p) = L(q) = k. Let N = pq
and λ = lcm(p−1, q−1)/2 1. Define a function L(x) = x−1N
and select a generator g of order ord(g) = (p− 1)(q − 1)/2.
The system public parameter is PP = (g,N). The master
secret key of the system is SK = λ. A user i in the system is
assigned a secret key ski ∈ ZN and a public key pki = gski
mod N2.
Encryption: On input a plaintext m ∈ ZN , a user randomly
selects r ∈ [1, N/4] and uses his public key pki to encrypt m
1lcm : lowest common multiple.
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to ciphertext [m]pki = (C1, C2), in which C1 = pk
r
i (1+mN)
mod N2 and C2 = gr mod N2.
Decryption with weak secret key: On input ciphertext
[m]pki and weak private key ski, the message can be recovered
by computing m = L(C1/Cski2 mod N
2).
Decryption with master secret key: Using master se-
cret key SK = λ of the system, any ciphertext [m]pki
encrypted by any public key can be decrypted by computing
Cλ1 = (pk
r
i )
λ(1 + mNλ) = (1 + mNλ) mod N2. Since
gcd(λ,N) = 1 holds 2, we have m = L(Cλ1 mod N
2)λ−1
mod N.
Master secret key splitting: The master secret key SK = λ
can be randomly split into two parts SK1 = λ1 and SK2 = λ2
such that λ1 + λ2 ≡ 0 mod λ and λ1 + λ2 ≡ 1 mod N2.
Partial Decryption with SK1 (PD1): On input the cipher-
text [m]pki = (C1, C2), we can use SK1 = λ1 to compute
C
(1)
1 = (C1)
λ1 = (pkri )
λ1(1 +mNλ1) mod N
2.
Partial Decryption with SK2 (PD2): On input [m]pki and
C
(1)
1 , we can use SK2 = λ2 to compute C
(2)
1 = (C1)
λ2 =
(pkri )
λ2(1+mNλ1) mod N
2. The message can be recovered
by computing m = L(C(1)1 · C(2)1 ).
Ciphertext Refresh (CR): CR algorithm is utilized to
refresh a ciphertext [m]pki = (C1, C2) into a new ciphertext
[m′]pki = (C
′
1, C
′
2) such that m = m
′. It selects a random
r′ ∈ ZN , calculates C ′1 = C1·pkr
′
i mod N
2 and C ′2 = C2·gr
′
mod N2.
It is easy to verify that PCTD is additive homomorphic:
[m1]pki · [m2]pki = [m1 +m2]pki and ([m]pki)r = [r ·m]pki
for a random r ∈ ZN .
The following two protocols in [40] are also utilized in the
proposed system. Let pkA and pkB be the public keys of users
A and B. pkΣ is another public key that will be defined later.
Secure Addition Protocol across Domains (SAD): Given
[X]pkA and [Y ]pkB , SAD protocol securely calculates [X +
Y ]pkΣ .
Secure Multiplication Protocol across Domains (SMD):
Given [X]pkA and [Y ]pkB , SMD protocol securely calculates
[X · Y ]pkΣ .
B. Keyword Representation and Encryption
An important issue is how can we transform a keyword into
a ciphertext to support any keyword in any language without
predefined keyword set. We design a secure keyword to cipher-
text algorithm (K2C) to fulfill the requirement, which mainly
includes the following steps. (1) Map each character (including
the special character) in the keyword into its unicode (UTF-
16: 16-bit Unicode Transformation Format) [48]; (2) convert
each hexadecimal unicode into decimal integer; (3) according
to the position of the character in the keyword, multiply the
decimal integer of the character with a weight; (4) add all the
weighted decimal integer into a big integer; and (5) utilize the
PCTD encryption algorithm and data owner’s public key to
encrypt the big integer of the keyword into a ciphertext.
An example is given in Fig. 2 to illustrate how to transform
the string “keyword” in English, Chinese, Korean and Japanese
2gcd: greatest common divider.
languages into a ciphertext using K2C algorithm. It is worth
noting that the K2C algorithm can successfully convert a
keyword into a unique big integer, which can greatly solve
the erroneous probability problem by using the bloom filter in
other searchable encryption schemes [38], [47].
C. Encrypted Keyword Equivalence Testing Protocol
After keyword is encrypted, another crucial issue is to test
whether two keyword ciphertexts contain the same keyword.
A secure keyword equivalent test protocol across domains
(KET) is designed to fulfill the task. Input two encrypted
keywords [X]pkA and [Y ]pkB that are encrypted by differ-
ent public keys, KET protocol outputs an encrypted result
[u∗]pkΣ to indicate whether two keywords are the same. In
order to make the protocol properly work, we require that
L(X),L(Y ) < L(N)/4. CP and CSP will jointly execute the
protocol using the assigned keys SK1 and SK2, respectively.
Step 1: CP computes
[X1]pkA = ([X]pkA)
2 · [1]pkA = [2X + 1]pkA ;
[Y1]pkB = ([Y ]pkB )
2 = [2Y ]pkB ;
[X2]pkA = ([X]pkA)
2 = [2X]pkA ;
[Y2]pkB = ([Y ]pkB )
2 · [1]pkB = [2Y + 1]pkB .
Then, CP randomly selects r1, r2, r3, r4 such that
L(r1),L(r2) < L(N)/4 − 1, L(r3),L(r4) < L(N)/8. Then,
CP flips random coins s1, s2 ∈ {0, 1}.
CP and CSP jointly execute the following operations.
If s1 = 1, [γ1]pkΣ = SAD(([X1]pkA)
r1 , ([Y1]pkB )
N−r1).
If s1 = 0, [γ1]pkΣ = SAD(([X1]pkA)
N−r1 , ([Y1]pkB )
r1).
If s2 = 1, [γ2]pkΣ = SAD(([X2]pkA)
N−r2 , ([Y2]pkB )
r2).
If s2 = 0, [γ2]pkΣ = SAD(([X2]pkA)
r2 , ([Y2]pkB )
N−r2).
CP calculates l1 = [γ1]pkΣ · [r3]pkΣ , l2 = [γ2]pkΣ · [r4]pkΣ ,
l′1 = PD1SK1(l1), l
′
2 = PD1SK1(l2) and sends (l1, l
′
1, l2, l
′
2)
to CSP.
Step 2: CSP decrypts l′′1 = PD2SK2(l1, l′1), l′′2 =
PD2SK2(l2, l
′
2). If L(l′′1 ) > L(N)/2, CSP sets u′1 = 0 and
u′1 = 1 otherwise. If L(l′′2 ) > L(N)/2, CSP sets u′2 = 0 and
u′2 = 1 otherwise. Then, CSP encrypts u
′
1, u
′
2 (with public key
pkΣ) to ([u′1]pkΣ , [u
′
2]pkΣ), which are sent to CP.
Step 3: Receiving ([u′1]pkΣ , [u′2]pkΣ), CP calculates as be-
low.
If s1 = 1, CP computes [u1]pkΣ = [u
′
1]pkΣ ; otherwise, CP
computes [u1]pkΣ = [1]pkΣ · ([u′1]pkΣ)N−1 = [1− u′1]pkΣ .
If s2 = 1, CP computes [u2]pkΣ = [u
′
2]pkΣ ; otherwise, CP
computes [u2]pkΣ = [1]pkΣ · ([u′2]pkΣ)N−1 = [1− u′2]pkΣ .3
Then, CP and CSP jointly calculates [u∗]pkΣ =
SMD([u1]pkΣ , [u2]pkΣ).
If u∗ = 1, it indicates that the two keywords are the same.
Otherwise, u∗ = 0.
3If u1 = 1, it indicates X ≥ Y ; otherwise, u1 = 0. If u2 = 1, it indicates
Y ≥ X; otherwise, u2 = 0.
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Fig. 2: Example of Keyword to Ciphertext
IV. PROPOSED SYSTEM
In the proposed system (shown in Fig. 1), KGC firstly gener-
ates the master secret key for the system and the public/secret
key pairs for the users, and partial strong secret keys for the
CP and CSP (see step 1 in Fig. 1). Then, the data users apply
search authorization from a single data owner or multiple data
owners (step 2). The data owner sets an authorization time
such that the search privilege expires automatically when the
time is out. In the encryption phase (step 3), the data owner
encrypts the file and a set of keywords, which are extracted
from the file. To measure the importance of the keywords, a set
of keyword weights are set and encrypted by the data owner.
The encrypted files and keyword indexes are then uploaded to
the CP. In the query phase (step 4), the data user designates a
set of query keywords and a set of preference scores for the
query keywords. Then, he generates the trapdoor of the query
keywords and preference scores. The trapdoor is sent to the CP
to issue a search query. In the search phase, the CP verifies the
search authority of the data user. If it is valid, CP calculates
the relevance score of the encrypted file and the trapdoor. The
calculated relevance score is in the encrypted form. Then, CP
leverages the secure data retrieval protocol to get the top-k
relevant encrypted files, which are returned to the data user
(step 5). In the decryption phase, the data user recovers the
top-k plaintext file (step 6). The communication channel in
the system should be secure channel, protected using, for
example, SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) or TLS (Transport Layer
Security). Table I shows the main notations in this paper.
A. Key Generation
KGC runs KeyGen algorithm of PCTD (Section III) to
generate the system public parameter PP = (g,N), strong
master secret key MSK = λ and user Ai’s public/secret
key pair pkAi = g
θi , skAi = θi. KGC also generates a
master public key MPK = gλ. MSK is kept secret by KGC
and MPK is public. Then, KGC executes master secret key
splitting algorithm of PCTD to generate partial strong secret
keys SK1 = λ1 and SK2 = λ2, which are secretly sent to
CP and CSP, respectively. skAi is confidentially sent to user
Ai and pkAi is public.
TABLE I: Notations
Notation Description
MPK/MSK master public/secret key
pk/sk public/secret key of user
SK1, SK2 partial strong secret keys
L(X) bit length of X
[X]pk the ciphertext of X (encrypted by pk)
SEnc/SDec symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm
Sig/V erify signature/verification algorithm
CER/RV K authorization/revocation certificate
AT/RT authorization time period/revocation time
kw/α extracted keyword/keyword weight
qw/β query keyword/preference score
W/Q encrypted index/encrypted query
M/ID/K file/file identity/file encryption key
[I]pkΣ encrypted relevance score
K2C secure keyword to ciphertext algorithm
KET secure keyword equivalent test protocol across domains
MKS secure multiple keyword search protocol across domains
MAX secure maximum protocol across domains
MAXn secure maximum out of n protocol across domains
Top-K secure top-k data retrieval protocol across domains
Let SEnc/SDec denote a symmetric encryption/decryption
pair (with key space K) that is cryptographically secure. Let
Sig/V erify denote signature generation/verification pair that
is strongly unforgeable. The concrete algorithms will not be
specified in this paper. We also define hash functions H1 :
{0, 1}∗ → ZN and H2 : ZN → K.
To simplify the presentation, we utilize the element in ZN
to be the secret key of Sig algorithm. In practical usage, the
signature key can be easily derived from the element in ZN
using a hash function.
B. User Authorization and Revocation
1) Single Data Owner Scenario: Suppose user B wants
to be authorized to search over data owner A1’s data from
1st Jan. 2016 to 1st Jan. 2017 (authorization time AT1 =
“20160101 − 20170101”). User B should send the message
(B,AT1) to data owner A1 to apply for the authorization. If
it is permitted, A1 will generate the authorization certificate
for B.
CERA1,B = 〈cer = (A1, B,AT1, pkΣ), Sig(cer, skA1)〉,
where pkΣ = gskΣ , skΣ = H1(A1, B,AT1, skA1).
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Fig. 3: Encryption Illustration
The secret key skΣ is given to B via secure channel.
CERA1,B will be sent to KGC, CP, CSP and user B. It will
automatically be invalid when the current time is out of AT1
and user’s authorization will be revoked.
If A1 plans to revoke B’s privilege in the period of AT1,
he should create a revocation certificate RVKA1,B as
〈rvk = (CERA1,B , revoke,RT ), Sig(rvk, skA1)〉,
where RT is the revocation time. Then, RVKA1,B is sent to
KGC, CP, CSP and user B.
2) Multiple Data Owners Scenario: Suppose user B
wants to simultaneous query information from data owners
(A1, · · · , Am)’s files. He should firstly get the permissions
(CERAi,B , 1 ≤ i ≤ m) from each owner. Then, he applies
the simultaneously query authorization from KGC. After ver-
ifying the certificates, KGC will calculate the authorization
time period ATΣ = AT1
⋂ · · ·⋂ATm. Then KGC creates
authorization certificate CERΣ,B as
〈cer = (A1, · · · , Am, B,ATΣ, pkΣ), Sig(cer,MSK)〉,
where pkΣ = gskΣ , skΣ = H1(A1, · · · , Am, B,ATΣ,MSK).
skΣ is confidentially delivered to user B and pkΣ is public to
CP, CSP and user B.
To revoke CERAi,B within the time period ATΣ, KGC has
to generate a revocation certificate RVKΣ,B as
〈rvk = (CERΣ,B , revoke,RT ), Sig(rvk,MSK)〉,
where RT is the revocation time. Then, RVKΣ,B is sent to
CP, CSP and user B.
C. Encryption
Suppose a data owner Ai want to upload a file Mγj to the
cloud. He follows the steps below to encrypt the data. Fig. 3
illustrates the encryption algorithm.
1) Data owner Ai extracts a set of keywords
{kw1, · · · , kwn1} to describe the file. In order to
differentiate the importance of the keyword, Ai
sets keyword weights {α1, · · · , αn1} ∈ ZN for the
keywords. There are many ways to compute keyword
weight, such as TF-IDF (term frequency and inverse
document frequency). The data owner selects a method
to define the keyword weight, which is not specified in
this paper.
2) Ai encrypts the keywords using K2C algorithm to
get {[kw1]pkAi , · · · , [kwn1 ]pkAi }. The keyword weight-
s are encrypted (using the PCTD algorithm) to
{[α1]pkAi , · · · , [αn1 ]pkAi}. A pair of encrypted key-
word and keyword weight is denoted as Wk =
([kwk]pkAi , [αk]pkAi ), 1 ≤ k ≤ n1. Denote WAi,γj =
(W1, · · · ,Wn1).
3) The file identity IDγj ∈ ZN and file encryption key
Kγj ∈ ZN are encrypted (using the PCTD algorithm)
to [IDγj ]pkAi and [Kγj ]pkAi .
4) Using hash function H2 : ZN → K, the file encryption
key Kγj is hashed to K
′
γj = H2(Kγj ) ∈ K. Then,
Ai utilizes symmetric encryption algorithm SEnc to
encrypt the file Mγj into an encrypted file Cγj =
SEnc(Mγj ,K
′
γj ).
5) Ai sends EAi,γj = (WAi,γj , [IDγj ]pkAi , [Kγj ]pkAi ) and
encrypted file Cγj to cloud platform.
Discussion: If the keyword weight is a decimal (such as TF-
IDF), the data owner could multiply all the keyword weights
with an integer (such as 10 or 100) such that these decimals
are mapped into ZN .
D. Query
In the query phase, user B generates a trapdoor to issue the
query (Fig. 4).
1) B specifies the query keywords {qw1, · · · , qwn2} and
the preference scores of the keywords {β1, · · · , βn2},
which indicates the importance of the keyword in the
query.
2) B uses K2C to encrypt the query keywords and
obtains {[qw1]pkB , · · · , [qwn2 ]pkB}. The preference s-
cores are encrypted (using the PCTD algorithm)
to {[β1]pkB , · · · , [βn2 ]pkB}. Denote tuple Qk =
{[qwk]pkB , [βk]pkB} (1 ≤ k ≤ n2) and Q =
(Q1, · · · , Qn2).
3) B signs on the query Q using his private key skB and
generates a signature SQ = Sig(Q, skB).
4) B sends the encrypted query Q, signature SQ and his
identity UserB to cloud platform.
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E. Search
Receiving the keyword search request, cloud platform
firstly verifies whether B is authorized to access to the
data. If B has the privilege, CS verifies the signature SQ of
encrypted query Q using user B’s public key pkB . If it is
not valid, the query will be rejected. Otherwise, CP responds
to the search query. (1) CP will firstly compute the relevance
score of the encrypted query Q and the encrypted index for
each authorized document. (2) Then, the encrypted files that
have the top-k highest relevance scores will be returned to
user. The concrete procedures are illustrated as below.
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Fig. 5: Relevance Score Computation
E.1. Relevance Score Computation
In order to calculate the relevance score between search
query and the file index, we design a secure multiple keyword
search protocol across domains (MKS) to compute the score.
Algorithm 1: SECURE MULTIPLE KEYWORD SEARCH
PROTOCOL ACROSS DOMAINS (MKS)
Input: Encrypted indexes W = (W1, · · · ,Wn1) and search
query Q = (Q1, · · · , Qn2), where
Wi = 〈[Xi]pkA , [αi]pkA〉, Qj = 〈[Yj ]pkB , [βj ]pkB 〉.
Output: [I]pkΣ .
1 Initialize [I]pkΣ = [0]pkΣ ;
2 for j = 1 to n2 do
3 for i = 1 to n1 do
4 CP and CSP jointly calculate
[ui]pkΣ = KET([Xi]pkA , [Yj ]pkB );
5 [s′i]pkΣ = SMD([αi]pkA , [βj ]pkB );
6 [si]pkΣ = SMD([ui]pkΣ , [s
′
i]pkΣ);
7 CP calculates [I]pkΣ = [I]pkΣ · [si]pkΣ ;
8 Return [I]pkΣ .
The inputs of MKS protocol are the encrypted index
WAi,γj = (W1, · · · ,Wn1) and the encrypted query Q =
(Q1, · · · , Qn2), where Wk1 = ([kwk1 ]pkAi , [αk1 ]pkAi ) for 1 ≤
k1 ≤ n1 and Qk2 = {[qwk2 ]pkB , [βk2 ]pkB} for 1 ≤ k2 ≤ n2.
It will output an encrypted relevance score [I]pkΣ under public
key pkΣ.
For each queried keyword Yj (1 ≤ j ≤ n2 in Line 2), the
MKS protocol calculates its relevance score with the encrypted
index. In order to achieve this purpose, the algorithm firstly
computes the relevance score of Yj and Xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n1 in
Line 3).
1) In line 4, it utilizes KET algorithm to test whether Xi =
Yj . It outputs [ui]pkΣ = [1]pkΣ if Xi = Yj . Otherwise,
it outputs [ui]pkΣ = [0]pkΣ .
2) In line 5, it calculates the multiplication of the keyword
weight αi (of Xi) and the preference score βj (of Yj)
[s′i]pkΣ = [αi · βj ]pkΣ = SMD([αi]pkA , [βj ]pkB ).
3) In line 6, if Xi = Yj , the relevance score of Xi and Yj
is [si]pkΣ = [αi · βj ]pkΣ since
SMD([ui]pkΣ , [s
′
i]pkΣ) = SMD([1]pkΣ , [αi · βj ]pkΣ).
Otherwise, [si]pkΣ = [0]pkΣ since
SMD([ui]pkΣ , [s
′
i]pkΣ) = SMD([0]pkΣ , [αi · βj ]pkΣ).
4) In line 7, the relevance score si is added to I
[I]pkΣ · [si]pkΣ = [I + si]pkΣ .
After the computation of relevance score, EAi,γj =
(WAi,γj , [IDγj ]pkAi , [Kγj ]pkAi ) is transformed into TAi,γj =
([Iγj ]pkΣ , [IDγj ]pkAi , [Kγj ]pkAi ) (Fig. 5).
Note: The computation overhead of the MKS protocol does
not linearly increases with n1 × n2. The keyword equality
tests executed by the KET protocol are independent and
can be calculated in parallel. The computation time of MKS
protocol is a little higher than that of the KET protocol when
parallel computation is leveraged, rather than linearly grow
with n1 × n2. It is demonstrated by the performance test in
Section V.
E.2. Top-k Ranking
After the relevance scores are calculated, it is necessary to
find the top-k relevant encrypted files according to the scores.
The requirements of the top-k ranking are listed below. (1)
During the ranking process, the plaintext of the encrypted
relevance score should not be revealed to both CP and CSP.
(2) The CP and CSP do not know which top-k documents are
returned to user.
In order to realize top-k ranking, three privacy-preserving
protocols are proposed.
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1) Secure maximum protocol across domains (MAX) will
figure out the encrypted file (with the maximum rele-
vance score) from two encrypted files.
2) Secure maximum out of n protocol across domains
(MAXn) will utilize MAX protocol to find the encrypted
file (with the maximum relevance score) from n encrypt-
ed files.
3) Secure top-k data retrieval protocol across domains
(Top-K) will leverage MAXn protocol to find the top-k
relevant files.
E.2.1. Secure Maximum Protocol Across Domains (MAX)
Given TAi1 ,γj1 = ([Iγj1 ]pkΣ , [IDγj1 ]pkAi1 , [Kγj1 ]pkAi1 )
and TAi2 ,γj2 = ([Iγj2 ]pkΣ , [IDγj2 ]pkAi2 , [Kγj2 ]pkAi2 ) that are
encrypted using different keys, MAX protocol will output a
new tuple TU = ([IU ]pkΣ , [IDU ]pkΣ , [KU ]pkΣ), such that
IU = max(Iγj1 , Iγj2 ) and IDU , KU correspond to its file
identity and file encryption key. In the protocol, CP and CSP
could not distinguish the source of TU . It has three steps and
requires the interaction between CP and CSP. (The correctness
of MAX protocol is verified in Supplemental Materials B.)
Step 1: CP computes:
[I ′γj1 ]pkΣ = [Iγj1 ]
2
pkΣ · [1]pkΣ = [2Iγj1 + 1]pkΣ ;
[I ′γj2 ]pkΣ = [Iγj2 ]
2
pkΣ = [2Iγj2 ]pkΣ .
The purpose of the calculation is that if Iγj1 ≥ Iγj2 and
Iγj1 , Iγj2 ≥ 0, we have I ′γj1 > I ′γj2 .
Then, CP randomly selects r1, r′1, r2, r3, r4 ∈ ZN , where
L(r1) < L(N)/4 − 1, L(r′1) < L(N)/8. Then, CP flips a
random coin s ∈ {0, 1}.
If s = 1, CP and CSP jointly calculate:
C1 = ([I
′
γj1
]pkΣ)
r1 · ([I ′γj2 ]pkΣ)
N−r1 · [r′1]pkΣ (1)
= [r1(I
′
γj1
− I ′γj2 ) + r
′
1]pkΣ ;
C2 = [Iγj2 ]pkΣ · ([Iγj1 ]pkΣ)N−1 · [r2]pkΣ (2)
= [Iγj2 − Iγj1 + r2]pkΣ ;
C3 = SAD([IDγj2 ]pkAi2 , ([IDγj1 ]pkAi1 )
N−1) · [r3]pkΣ (3)
= [IDγj2 − IDγj1 + r3]pkΣ ;
C4 = SAD([Kγj2 ]pkAi2 , ([Kγj1 ]pkAi1 )
N−1) · [r4]pkΣ (4)
= [Kγj2 −Kγj1 + r4]pkΣ .
If s = 0, CP and CSP jointly calculates:
C1 = ([I
′
γj2
]pkΣ)
r1 · ([I ′γj1 ]pkΣ)
N−r1 · [r′1]pkΣ (5)
= [r1(I
′
γj2
− I ′γj1 ) + r
′
1]pkΣ ;
C2 = [Iγj1 ]pkΣ · ([Iγj2 ]pkΣ)N−1 · [r2]pkΣ (6)
= [Iγj1 − Iγj2 + r2]pkΣ ;
C3 = SAD([IDγj1 ]pkAi1 , ([IDγj2 ]pkAi2 )
N−1) · [r3]pkΣ (7)
= [IDγj1 − IDγj2 + r3]pkΣ ;
C4 = SAD([Kγj1 ]pkAi1 , ([Kγj2 ]pkAi2 )
N−1) · [r4]pkΣ (8)
= [Kγj1 −Kγj2 + r4]pkΣ .
CP utilizes partial strong secret key SK1 to calculate C ′1 =
PD1SK1(C1) and sends C
′
1, C1, C2, C3, C4 to CSP.
Step 2: After receiving C ′1, C1, C2, C3, C4, CSP calculates
C ′′1 by using his partial strong secret key SK2
C ′′1 = PD2SK2(C1, C
′
1).
If C ′′1 < L(N)/2, CSP sets α = 0 and computes
C5 = [0]pkΣ , C6 = [0]pkΣ , C7 = [0]pkΣ .
If C ′′1 > L(N)/2, CSP sets α = 1 and computes
C5 = CR(C2), C6 = CR(C3), C7 = CR(C4).
Then, CSP encrypts [α]pkΣ and sends ([α]pkΣ , C5, C6, C7)
to CP.
Step 3: When ([α]pkΣ , C5, C6, C7) is received, CP will
execute the following computations according to the value of
s tossed in step 1.
If s = 1, CP and CSP jointly compute
[IU ]pkΣ = [Iγj1 ]pkΣ · C5 · ([α]pkΣ)N−r2 ;
[IDU ]pkΣ = SAD([IDγj1 ]pkAi1 , C6) · ([α]pkΣ)
N−r3 ;
[KU ]pkΣ = SAD([Kγj1 ]pkAi1 , C7) · ([α]pkΣ)
N−r4 .
If s = 0, CP and CSP jointly compute
[IU ]pkΣ = [Iγj2 ]pkΣ · C5 · ([α]pkΣ)N−r2 ;
[IDU ]pkΣ = SAD([IDγj2 ]pkAi2 , C6) · ([α]pkΣ)
N−r3 ;
[KU ]pkΣ = SAD([Kγj2 ]pkAi2 , C7) · ([α]pkΣ)
N−r4 .
It is obvious that IU is the maximum relevance score between
Iγj1 and Iγj2 .
E.2.2. Secure Maximum Out of n Protocol Across Domains
(MAXn)
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Fig. 6: Illustration of MAXn Protocol
Taken as input n encrypted tuples T1, · · · , Tn, the MAXn
protocol could output a new tuple
TMAX = ([IMAX ]pkΣ , [IDMAX ]pkΣ , [KMAX ]pkΣ),
such that IMAX = max(I1, · · · , In) and IDMAX , KMAX
correspond to its file identity and file encryption key. In the
protocol, CP and CSP can not recover or distinguish the source
of TMAX . The construction is illustrated as below.
As shown in Fig. 6, MAXn protocol needs dlog2ne rounds
to find the maximum tuple. In each round, the maximum
tuple of the two adjacent encrypted tuples will be computed
(use MAX protocol). After dlog2ne rounds, there is only one
tuple left, which is the maximum tuple TMAX .
E.2.3. Secure Top-K Data Retrieval Protocol Across Domains
(Top-K)
1545-5971 (c) 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TDSC.2017.2787588, IEEE
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING 9
Algorithm 2: SECURE TOP-K DATA RETRIEVAL PROTO-
COL ACROSS DOMAINS (TOP-K)
Input: CP has n ciphertext T1, · · · , Tn, (k < n), where
Ti = 〈Ti,1, Ti,2, Ti,3〉 = 〈[Ii]pkΣ , [IDi]pkAi , [Ki]pkAi 〉.
Output: CP can get top-k file names and file secret keys (in
encrypted form) corresponding to top-k relevance
scores.
1 Initialize sets Sa = ∅ and Sb = {T1, · · · , Tn};
2 for i = 1 to k do
3 CP and CSP jointly run TMAXi = MAXn(T1, · · · , Tn) to
get the tuple
TMAXi = 〈[IMAXi ]pkΣ , [IDMAXi ]pkΣ , [KMAXi ]pkΣ〉
with maximum relevance score, where T1, · · · , Tn ∈ Sb;
4 Insert the tuple TMAXi into set Sa;
5 for j = 1 to n do
6 CP and CSP jointly calculate:
Vj = SAD(([IDMAXi ]pkΣ)
rj , (Tj,2)
(N−rj)), in which
rj ∈ ZN is a random number;
7 (@CP): Partially decrypt Vj to V ′j = PD1SK1(Vj);
8 Permute (Vj , V ′j ) using permutation function pii. The result
is denoted as (Vpii(j), V
′
pii(j)
), which are sent to CSP;
9 (@CSP): Decrypt V ′′pii(j) = PD2SK2(Vpii(j), V
′
pii(j)
) by
using SK2 and denote it as βj = V ′′pii(j);
10 if βj = 0 then
11 denote Apii(j) = [0]pkΣ ;
12 else
13 denote Apii(j) = [1]pkΣ ;
14 Send Apii(j) back to CP;
15 (@CP) CP obtains Aj by using permutation pi−1i ;
16 CP refreshes {[I1]pkΣ , · · · , [In]pkΣ} ∈ Sb by computing
17 for j = 1 to n do
18 CP and CSP jointly calculate:
[Ij ]pkΣ = SMD(Tj,1, Aj);
19 Return the set Sa = (TMAX1 , · · · , TMAXk ).
On input n encrypted tuples T1, · · · , Tn, Top-K protocol
outputs the k new encrypted tuples that have the k highest
relevance scores. The protocol is illustrated as following.
Firstly, it initializes an empty set Sa to store the top-k result.
The set Sb is assigned with T1, · · · , Tn. The Top-K protocol
needs k rounds to get the result. In each round, the protocol
picks up the maximum tuple. The round is illustrated in detail
as following.
1) (Line 3-4) Run MAXn protocol to get the maximum tuple
TMAXi in the i-th round, which is inserted into Sa.
2) (Line 5-7) For each encrypted tuple in Sb, CP and CSP
calculates
Vj = SAD(([IDMAXi ]pkΣ)
rj , (Tj,2)
(N−rj))
= [rj(IDMAXi − IDj)]pkΣ .
If IDj = IDMAXi , we have Vj = [0]pkΣ . Otherwise,
Vj 6= [0]pkΣ . Then, CP partially decrypts Vj and stores
the result in V ′j .
3) (Line 8) To conceal the plaintext information, CP
uses a permutation pii to disturb (V1, · · · , Vn) and
(V ′1 , · · · , V ′n). Then, {(Vpii(j), V ′pii(j))} for 1 ≤ j ≤ n
are sends to CSP.
4) (Line 9-14) CSP decrypts {(Vpii(j), V ′pii(j))} to get βj
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. If βj = 0, CSP sets Apii(j) = [0]pkΣ .
Otherwise, Apii(j) = [1]pkΣ .
5) (Line 15) Receiving (Apii(1), · · · , Apii(n)), CP firstly
utilizes pi−1i recover the order and obtains (A1, · · · , An).
It easy to find that the origin tuple Tζ of TMAXi will
have Aζ = [0]pkΣ and other tuples will have Aj = [1]pkΣ
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n and j 6= ζ.
6) (Line 16-18) The {[I1]pkΣ , · · · , [In]pkΣ} ∈ Sb are re-
freshed. [Iζ ]pkΣ in the origin tuple Tζ of TMAXi will
be set to [0]pkΣ since [Iζ ]pkΣ = SMD(Tζ,1, Aj) =
SMD([Iζ ]pkΣ , [0]pkΣ) = [Iζ ∗ 0]pkΣ = [0]pkΣ .
For 1 ≤ j ≤ n and j 6= ζ, [Ij ]pkΣ will not be changed s-
ince [Ij ]pkΣ = SMD(Tj,1, Aj) = SMD([Ij ]pkΣ , [1]pkΣ) =
[Ij ∗ 1]pkΣ = [Ij ]pkΣ .
After k rounds computation, Sa will contain k tuples that
have the k highest relevance scores.
F. Decryption
Receiving the top-k encrypted files, the user B utilizes
public key pkΣ to recover the relevance score Ii, file identity
IDi and the key Ki for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Then, using the
private information retrieval (PIR) [49], [50] or oblivious RAM
(ORAM) methods [51], [52], the user securely gets back the
corresponding encrypted files from CP without leaking the
access pattern. The key Ki could be hashed to symmetric key
K ′i = H2(Ki) ∈ K, which is utilized to decrypt the file Mi.
G. Implication of the System
This system can be used in the secure storage system, such
as the secure cloud storage system, encrypted healthcare record
storage system, secure multimedia storage system, etc. Take
the secure electronic health storage system as an example.
The patients are the data owners, and the doctors and nurses
are the data users. Suppose that a medical director A of the
pediatric department has got the access authorization from
a set of young patients (B1, B2, B3). The young patient B1
suffered from pedopneumonia with a high fever. The keywords
extracted from his electronic health record (EHR) (file identity
ID1) are “pedopneumonia, fever” with keywords weights “7,
3”. B2 suffered from parascarlatina with a low fever and a
slight cough, and his EHR (file identity ID2) has keywords
“parascarlatina, fever, cough” with weights “7, 1, 1”. B3 suf-
fered from pedopneumonia with a severe cough, and his EHR
(file identity ID3) has keywords “pedopneumonia, cough”
with weights “7, 5”. These files and keywords and weights
are encrypted using the encryption algorithm in Section IV-C.
The medical director A studies the pedopneumonia disease.
He figures out a set of query keywords “pedopneumonia, fever,
cough” with preference scores “5, 2, 1”, and wants to get
the top-2 results. The search query is encrypted using the
query algorithm in Section IV-D. Then, CP executes the search
algorithm in Section IV-E and returns the encrypted EHRs
with file identities ID1, ID3. In the search process, the CP
and CSP do not know which encrypted files match with the
query trapdoor and which documents are returned to the user.
Finally, A decrypts the result using the authorization secret
key skΣ.
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V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the perfor-
mance of our MRSE in this section. The experiments are
performed on PC running Windows 7 64-bit operation system
with the following settings: Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4790 CPU
@3.60GHz, 12GB RAM. All the protocols and algorithms are
programmed using Java language and executed by Eclipse
application program. We utilize multi-thread programming
method to implement the system.
The length of N (denoted as L(N)) will affect the perfor-
mance of the protocols to a great extent. Both the running time
and communication cost of these protocols will increase with
the length of N . We utilize 512, 768, 1024, 1280, 1536, 1792
and 2048 bits to denote L(N) in the following experiments,
respectively. When L(N) = 1024, it achieves 80-bit security
level [53]. We recommend the readers to use L(N) = 1024 as
the parameter in real applications to balance the performance
and security level.
We set the file number |F | = 128, 512, 1024, 2048, 4096 to
test the system performance. In the test, eight keywords are
extracted from a file to build the encrypted index and four
keyword are specified to generate a keyword trapdoor. The
number of the extracted keyword and the queried keyword
can be changed according to the real application. In the
Encryption and Query algorithms, we also specify other
keyword numbers to evaluate their performances.
A. Performance of Crypto Primitives and Protocols
TABLE II: K2C Execution Time (s)
N 512 768 1024 1280 1536 1792 2048
K2C 0.005 0.007 0.016 0.029 0.055 0.074 0.110
TABLE III: KET Execution Time (s)
N 512 768 1024 1280 1536 1792 2048
CP 0.049 0.162 0.333 0.671 1.036 1.637 2.450
CSP 0.005 0.019 0.039 0.078 0.126 0.198 0.297
Total 0.054 0.181 0.372 0.749 1.162 1.835 2.747
TABLE IV: MAX Execution Time (s)
N 512 768 1024 1280 1536 1792 2048
CP 0.059 0.201 0.360 0.723 1.319 2.026 2.729
CSP 0.007 0.023 0.042 0.084 0.160 0.244 0.330
Total 0.066 0.224 0.402 0.807 1.479 2.270 3.059
TABLE V: MKS Execution Time (s)
N 512 768 1024 1280 1536 1792 2048
CP 0.213 0.496 0.981 1.836 3.473 4.418 6.807
CSP 0.025 0.059 0.118 0.221 0.451 0.533 0.812
Total 0.238 0.555 1.099 2.057 3.888 4.951 7.619
Firstly, we test the performance of the basic algorithms
and protocols of our proposed system on the PC in terms of
computation and communication overhead. Shown in Table II-
VI, all these protocols have performances increase with L(N).
The reason is that the overhead of basic calculations (such
TABLE VI: Communication Overhead (KB)
N 512 768 1024 1280 1536 1792 2048
KET 4.33 6.51 8.69 10.86 13.04 15.21 17.40
MAX 1.02 1.53 2.04 2.55 3.06 3.58 4.09
MKS 78.2 117.2 156.4 195.6 234.7 274.0 313.0
TABLE VII: MAXn Execution Time (s)
|F| 128 512 1024 2048 4096
CP 2.520 3.240 3.602 3.865 4.215
CSP 0.294 0.377 0.421 0.557 0.749
Total 2.814 3.617 4.023 4.422 4.964
as modular addition, multiplication and exponentiation) grow
with L(N).
• Table II shows the running time of K2C algorithm. When
L(N) = 1024, K2C algorithm requires 0.016 s to encrypt
a keyword into a ciphertext. Since this algorithm is
executed by CP, there is no communication cost.
• Table III shows the computation cost of KET protocol.
The communication cost between CP and CSP in KET
protocol is depicted in Table VI. When L(N) = 1024,
timeCP = 0.333 s, timeCSP = 0.039 s, timeTotal = 0.372
s and the communication cost is 8.69 KB. It indicates
that 0.372 s running time and 8.69 KB data transmission
is required for a privacy-preserving keyword equality test
across domains.
• Table IV shows the running time of MAX protocol that
varies with the bit number of N . The transmission cost
is shown in Table VI. When L(N) = 1024, timeCP =
0.360 s, timeCSP = 0.042 s, timeTotal = 0.402 s and the
communication cost is 2.04 KB.
• Table V and VI describe the computation and commu-
nication overheads of MKS protocol, in which a set of
KET protocols are executed to test the keywords equality.
These equality tests can be paralleled executed to improve
the efficiency using multi-thread programming method.
In the test, we set the encrypted index contain eight
keywords and the search query have four keywords.
When L(N) = 1024, timeCP = 0.981 s, timeCSP =
0.118 s, timeTotal = 1.099 s and the communication cost
is 156.4 KB.
• Table VII indicates that the computation cost of MAXn
protocol increases with the number n of encrypted files.
In this table, L(N) = 1024. As shown in Figure 6, the
MAX sub-protocol in the same level can be executed in
parallel. If |F | = n = 2δ , the time consumed by MAXn
protocol approximately equals to δ times of the running
TABLE VIII: TOP-1 Execution Time (s)
|F| 128 512 1024 2048 4096
CP 3.167 3.803 4.356 5.054 5.629
CSP 0.368 0.538 0.889 0.995 1.124
Total 3.535 4.341 5.245 6.049 6.753
TABLE IX: Communication Overhead (MB)
|F| 128 512 1024 2048 4096
MAXn 0.257 1.042 2.089 4.182 8.369
TOP-1 1.108 4.445 8.894 17.792 35.589
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Fig. 7: Computation Overhead Comparison
time of MAX sub-protocol. With the parallel computation,
when |F | = 4096, timeCP = 5.629 s, timeCSP = 1.124 s,
timeTotal = 6.753 s and the communication cost is 8.369
MB (shown in Table IX).
• Table VIII shows the computation overhead of Top-1
protocol that varies with the number |F | of encrypted
files. Here we set L(N) = 1024. The most important sub-
protocol in Top-1 is the MAXn protocol. Simillarly, we
also use parallel computations. When |F | = n = 4096,
timeCP = 5.353 s, timeCSP = 1.885 s, timeTotal = 7.238
s and the communication cost of Top-1 is 35.589 MB
(shown in Table IX). Since each loop in Top-K protocol
is exactly the same. We only test the performance of
Top-1. The readers can easily deduce the performance
of Top-K by multiplying a factor k.
TABLE X: Enc or Query Execution Time (s)
|KW| 1 2 3 4 5
Total 0.032 0.048 0.064 0.080 0.096
|KW| 6 7 8 9 10
Total 0.112 0.128 0.144 0.160 0.176
TABLE XI: Search Execution Time (s)
K 1 2 3 4 5
CP 5.353 10.706 16.059 21.411 26.765
CSP 1.885 3.769 5.653 7.537 9.422
Total 7.238 14.475 21.712 28.948 36.187
TABLE XII: KNN-SE Execution Time (s)
Relevance
|KW| KeyGen BuildIndex Trapdoor Score
Calculation
500 0.017 0.008 0.390 0.003
1000 0.078 0.030 3.253 0.003
1500 0.136 0.110 11.398 0.003
2000 0.303 0.189 29.229 0.003
2500 0.379 0.442 56.778 0.003
3000 0.665 0.592 90.278 0.003
3500 0.730 0.781 158.527 0.003
4000 1.453 0.832 229.628 0.003
4500 1.608 1.069 326.443 0.003
5000 1.871 1.969 435.608 0.003
5500 2.115 2.341 585.812 0.003
6000 2.541 2.710 766.110 0.003
B. Performance of Multi-user MRSE
In this subsection, we test the performance of the suggested
novel MRSE system. To achieve 80-bit security level, we
choose the parameter L(N) = 1024. The encrypted file
number |F | = 4096.
• Since the encryption index generation process in
Encyption algorithm and query generation process in
Query algorithm are almost the same, the performance
of these two algorithms are described in Table X. The
running time of Encyption and Query algorithms grows
with the number of keywords (denoted as |KW |). When
|KW | = 6 and 10, the execution times are 0.112 s and
0.176 s, respectively.
• The Search algorithm is executed by the interaction
between CP and CSP. The computation time of Search
algorithm ( shown in Table XI) varies with the number of
returned results. If only one result is returned, timeCP =
5.353 s, timeCSP = 1.885 s, timeTotal = 7.238 s. If
five results are returned, timeCP = 26.765 s, timeCSP =
9.422 s, timeTotal = 36.187 s. In order to improve user’s
experience, it is important to reduce the wait time of data
user after he submits a search query. One optimization
method is to return only one result to user each time.
When the user is decrypting the received result, the
following results will be continually returned to user.
The execution time of KNN-SE is shown in Table XII.
KNN-SE has execution times rapidly increase with the size
of predefined keywords set, which is denoted as |KW |. When
|KW | = 6000, KeyGentime = 2.541 s, BuildIndextime =
2.710 s, Trapdoortime = 766.11 s. When |KW | becomes
larger, the matrixes M1 and M2 will increase and the time
to compute M−11 and M
−1
2 grows quickly. The data users
have to consume more time to generate a search query.
The computation overhead of our system is compared with
KNN-SE in Fig. 7.
• In the key generation procedure (shown in Fig. 7(a)), our
system requires 4× 10−5 s to generate the master secret
key and a public/secret key pair for the user. The key
generation time of KNN-SE drastically increases with
the the size |KW | of predefined keywords set. When
|KW | = 500, the key generation time of KNN-SE is
0.017 s; and that is 2.541 s when |KW | = 6000.
• In the encryption procedure (shown in Fig. 7(b)), assume
that ten keywords are extracted from the file. Our system
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requires 0.176 s to build the encrypted keyword index.
The build index time of KNN-SE quickly grows with
|KW |. When |KW | = 2000, the build index time of
KNN-SE is 0.189 s; and that is 2.710 s when |KW | =
6000.
• In the query procedure (shown in Fig. 7(b)), assume that
ten keywords are queried. Our system requires 0.176
s to generate a trapdoor. The trapdoor generation time
of KNN-SE also rapidly increases with |KW |. When
|KW | = 500, the build index time of KNN-SE is 0.390
s; and that is 766.110 s when |KW | = 6000.
• The search time is not plotted since that of KNN-SE is
constant to be 0.003 s and that of our system is also
constant to be 7.238 s. Since the calculated relevance
score of KNN-SE is plaintext, its time consumption is
smaller than ours. Our system has better efficiency in
KeyGen,BuildIndex, Trapdoor algorithms.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we prove the security of the protocols under
the attack model (defined in Section II-B) and security model
(defined in Section II-C). Then, we analyze the security of the
proposed novel MRSE system.
A. Protocols Security Proof
Theorem 1. The KET protocol proposed in Section III-C
is secure to test the equality on two keyword ciphertext in
the presence of semi-honest (non-colluding) attackers A =
(AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2).
Please refer Supplemental Materials C for the security proof.
Theorem 2. The KET protocol is secure against the adversary
A∗ defined in the attack model.
Please refer Supplemental Materials C for the security proof.
Theorem 3. The MKS protocol proposed in Section IV-E is
secure to calculate the relevance score on encrypted index and
query in the presence of semi-honest (non-colluding) attackers
A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2).
Proof. MKS protocol calls KET and SMD as subprotocols and
all the transmitted data are encrypted using PCTD encryption.
Since KET and SMD protocols are proved secure in Theorem
1 and [40], the MKS protocol is also secure in the presence of
attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2). 
Theorem 4. The MKS protocol is secure against the adversary
A∗ defined in the attack model.
Proof. MKS protocol calls KET and SMD as subprotocols and
all the transmitted data are encrypted using PCTD encryption.
The KET protocol is proved secure against the adversary A∗
(defined in the attack model) in Theorem 2, and the SMD
protocol is proved secure in [40]. Thus, the MKS protocol
is also secure against the adversary A∗ defined in the attack
model. 
Theorem 5. The MAX protocol proposed in Section IV-E is
secure to calculate the maximum encrypted data (with highest
relevance score) on two encrypted ciphertext in the presence of
semi-honest (non-colluding) attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2).
Please refer Supplemental Materials C for the security proof.
Theorem 6. The MAX protocol is secure against the adversary
A∗ defined in the attack model.
Please refer Supplemental Materials C for the security proof.
Theorem 7. The MAXn protocol proposed in Section IV-E is
secure to calculate the maximum encrypted data (with highest
relevance score) on n encrypted ciphertext in the presence of
semi-honest (non-colluding) attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2).
Proof. MAXn protocol calls MAX as subprotocol and all data
are encrypted using PCTD encryption. Since MAX protocol is
proved secure in Theorem 5, the MAXn protocol is also secure
in the presence of attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2). 
Theorem 8. The MAXn protocol is secure against the adver-
sary A∗ defined in the attack model.
Proof. MAXn protocol calls MAX as subprotocol and all data
are encrypted using PCTD encryption. Since MAX protocol is
proved secure against the adversary A∗ (defined in the attack
model) in Theorem 6, the MAXn protocol is also secure against
the adversary A∗ defined in the attack model. 
Theorem 9. The Top-K protocol proposed in Section IV-E
is secure to calculate the top-k encrypted data (with highest
relevance scores) on encrypted ciphertext in the presence of
semi-honest (non-colluding) attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2).
Please refer Supplemental Materials C for the security proof.
Theorem 10. The Top-K protocol is secure against the
adversary A∗ defined in the attack model.
Please refer Supplemental Materials C for the security proof.
B. System Security Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the privacy of each algorithms
in novel MRSE system.
• Key Generation: The security of the user’s private key is
guaranteed by discrete logarithm problem. The security
of the secret keys of CP, CSP and KGC is ensured by the
IND-CPA security of PCTD.
• User Authorization and Revocation: Since the users and
KGC’s private keys are kept secret and the signature
system is cryptographically strong unforgeable, the se-
curity of authorization and revocation certificates can be
guaranteed.
• Encryption: Since the keywords, file identity and sym-
metric key are encrypted using PCTD encryption algo-
rithm, the encrypted index is secure. The privacy of file
is ensured by the semantic security of the symmetric
encryption algorithm.
• Query: The security analysis of Query algorithm is sim-
ilar to Encryption algorithm.
• Search: In the search phase, the privacy-preserving rele-
vance scores are calculated using MKS protocol. Then,
the top-k encrypted files are calculated using Top-K
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protocol. Since these two protocols are proved secure and
all transmitted data are ciphertext, the privacy of search
algorithm is ensured.
Next, we utilize the attack model in Section II-B to analyze
that our system is secure against adversary A∗.
(1) If A∗ eavesdrops all the the contents that are transmitted
between the challenge data user (including data owner)
and CP. The encrypted files and indexes and the queried
results can be gotten by A∗. The intermediate calculated
ciphertext that are transmitted between CP and CSP can
also be eavesdropped by A∗. Since these contents are all
protected by PCTD encryption during the transmission
process, A∗ is not capable to derive the plaintext without
the secret keys of data user, CP or CSP.
(2-3) Assume A∗ compromise CP or CSP and get the partial
strong private key λ1 or λ2. However, A∗ can not
simultaneously compromise CP and CSP. A∗ could not
get the strong secret key λ since it is randomly split into
two parts using “strong secret key splitting” algorithm of
PCDT. Even though A∗ could compromise CSP and get
the plaintext of intermediate result in these protocols,
he is not able to get any useful information since the
“blinding” method [54] is utilized in these protocols to
conceal the plaintext: a random number is added to or
multiplied with the message before they are sent to CSP.
(4) If the adversary A∗ gets the secret keys of data owners
or data users (except the challenge user’s secret key), he
could not decrypt the challenge user’s ciphertext. The
reason is that the private keys of different users are
irrelevant.
In Theorem 1-10, the protocols KET, MKS, MAX, MAXn,
Top-K are proved secure against the adversary A∗ defined in
the attack model and the semi-honest (non-colluding) attackers
A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2) defined in the security model. Thus,
this system is also secure against these adversaries.
VII. CONCLUSION
Multi-keyword rank searchable encryption (MRSE) is a
useful technique which allows data users to search over
encrypted data in the cloud. Many MRSE systems have been
proposed in the literature and most of them are constructed
based on the KNN-SE algorithms. In this paper, we firstly
pointed out several serious shortcomings of KNN-SE which
limit the practical applications of the existing MRSE systems.
We then proposed a new MRSE system which overcomes
all the defects of the KNN-SE based MRSE systems. Our
new system does not require a predefined keyword set at the
system setup phase and support keyword search in arbitrary
languages. The system allows flexible search authorization and
time-controlled revocation. In additon, the relevance scores
computed by the cloud server are in ciphertext form and the
server is not able to tell which documents are the top-k results.
We proved the security of the system and conducted extensive
computer simulations to demonstrate its efficiency.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS
A. Overview of KNN-SE
KNN-SE is a core component in most of the existing
MRSE systems. It is also referred to as secure inner product
computation or secure vector space model. We will overview
this method as below.
• KeyGen(k). The system firstly define a keyword set
KW = (kw1, · · · , kwk). On input the cardinality k of
set KW , the algorithm will output two k × k invertible
matrices (M1,M2) and a vector S ∈ {0, 1}k. The
symmetric secret key of user is sk = (M1,M2, S).
• BuildIndex(sk, F ). For each file F , the data owner will
generate a keyword vector I ∈ {0, 1}k and each bit I(j)
indicates whether the predefined keyword kwj appears
in F . Then, I is split into two vectors I ′, I ′′ ∈ {0, 1}k
following the rule: if S(j) = 1, I ′(j) = I ′′(j) = I(j);
if S(j) = 0, I ′(j) and I ′′(j) are set to random numbers
such that I ′(j) + I ′′(j) = I(j). Then, encrypt (I ′, I ′′)
with (M1,M2) and obtain EI = (M>1 · I ′,M>2 · I ′′),
which is the encrypted index.
• Trapdoor(W˜ ). On input a set of keywords W˜ , it will
generate a query vector Q ∈ {0, 1}k and each bit Q(j)
indicates whether the predefined keyword kwj appears in
W˜ . Then, Q is split into two vectors Q′, Q′′ ∈ {0, 1}k
following the rule: if S(j) = 1, Q′(j) and Q′′(j) are set
to random numbers such that Q′(j) +Q′′(j) = Q(j); if
S(j) = 0, Q′(j) = Q′′(j) = Q(j). Then, encrypt (I ′, I ′′)
with (M1,M2) and obtain EQ = (M−11 ·Q′,M−12 ·Q′′),
which is the encrypted trapdoor.
• Search(EI,EQ). On input encrypted index EI = (M>1 ·
I ′,M>2 · I ′′) and encrypted trapdoor EQ = (M−11 ·
Q′,M−12 ·Q′′), the relevance score of file F is computed
as
(M>1 · I ′,M>2 · I ′′) · (M−11 ·Q′,M−12 ·Q′′)
= M>1 · I ′ ·M−11 ·Q′ +M>2 · I ′′ ·M−12 ·Q′′
= I ′> ·Q′ + I ′′> ·Q′′ = I> ·Q.
After sorting these scores, the server returns the top-k
files that have the highest scores.
B. Correctness of MAX
The correctness of the MAX protocol can be verified as
below.
If s = 1 and I ′γj1 > I
′
γj2
, then C ′′1 < L(N)/2, α = 0 and
C5 = [0]pkΣ , C6 = [0]pkΣ , C7 = [0]pkΣ . The TU = ([IU ]pkΣ ,
[IDU ]pkΣ , [KU ]pkΣ) can be computed as
[IU ]pkΣ = [Iγj1 ]pkΣ · C5 · ([α]pkΣ)N−r2
= [Iγj1 ]pkΣ · [0]pkΣ · ([0]pkΣ)N−r2 = [Iγj1 ]pkΣ ;
[IDU ]pkΣ = SAD([IDγj1 ]pkAi1 , C6) · ([α]pkΣ)
N−r2
= SAD([IDγj1 ]pkAi1 , [0]pkΣ) · ([0]pkΣ)
N−r2
= [IDγj1 ]pkΣ ;
[KU ]pkΣ = SAD([Kγj1 ]pkAi1 , C7) · ([α]pkΣ)
N−r2
= SAD([Kγj1 ]pkAi1 , [0]pkΣ) · ([0]pkΣ)
N−r2
= [Kγj1 ]pkΣ .
If s = 1 and I ′A < I
′
B , then C
′′
1 > L(N)/2, α = 1 and C5 =
CR(C2), C6 = CR(C3), C7 = CR(C4). The TU = ([IU ]pkΣ ,
[IDU ]pkΣ , [KU ]pkΣ) can be computed as
[IU ]pkΣ = [Iγj1 ]pkΣ · C5 · ([α]pkΣ)N−r2
= [Iγj1 ]pkΣ · [Iγj2 − Iγj1 + r2]pkΣ · ([1]pkΣ)N−r2
= [Iγj2 ]pkΣ ;
[IDU ]pkΣ = SAD([IDγj1 ]pkAi1 , C6) · ([α]pkΣ)
N−r3
= SAD([IDγj1 ]pkAi1 , [IDγj2 − IDγj1 + r3]pkΣ) · ([1]pkΣ)
N−r3
= [IDγj2 ]pkΣ ;
[KU ]pkΣ = SAD([Kγj1 ]pkAi1 , C7) · ([α]pkΣ)
N−r4
= SAD([Kγj1 ]pkAi1 , [Kγj2 −Kγj1 + r4]pkΣ) · ([1]pkΣ)
N−r4
= [Kγj2 ]pkΣ .
When s = 0, TU = ([IU ]pkΣ , [IDU ]pkΣ , [KU ]pkΣ) can be
similarly computed. The correctness verification demonstrates
that the MAX protocol could output a new tuple TU (with the
maximum relevance score) from the two encrypted tuples.
C. Security Proof
Theorem 1. The KET protocol proposed in Section III-C
is secure to test the equality on two keyword ciphertext in
the presence of semi-honest (non-colluding) attackers A =
(AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2).
Proof. We now construct the following independent simu-
lators (SimD1 , SimS1 , SimS2).
SimD1 receives X and Y as input and simulates AD1
as following. It generates the ciphertext [X]pkA and [Y ]pkB
of X and Y , respectively. The entire view of AD1 is the
encrypted data, which in both real and ideal executions are
indistinguishable due to the IND-CPA security of PCTD [41].
SimS1 simulates AS1 as following. It randomly selects
Xˆ, Yˆ ∈ ZN and encrypts them into [Xˆ]pkA and [Yˆ ]pkB .
Then, it computes [Xˆ1]pkA = ([Xˆ]pkA)
2 · [1]pkA , [Yˆ1]pkB =
([Yˆ ]pkB )
2, [Xˆ2]pkA = ([Xˆ]pkA)
2, [Yˆ2]pkB = ([Yˆ ]pkB )
2 ·
[1]pkB . According to the randomly flipped coins s1, s2 ∈
{0, 1}, it inputs them into SimSADS1 in Ref. [40] and gets
l1, l2. Using PD1 algorithm, it computes l′1, l
′
2. It also ran-
domly selects uˆ′1, uˆ
′
2 ∈ {0, 1} and computes [uˆ′1]pkΣ , [uˆ′2]pkΣ .
According to the randomly flipped coins s1, s2 ∈ {0, 1}, it
calculates [uˆ1]pkΣ , [uˆ2]pkΣ and inputs them into Sim
SMD
S1
in
Ref. [40] and gets [uˆ∗]pkΣ . Then, SimS1 sends (l1, l2, l
′
1, l
′
2)
and the intermediate encrypted data of SimSADS1 and Sim
SMD
S1
to AS1 . If AS1 replies with ⊥, then SimS1 outputs ⊥.
The IND-CPA security of PCTD ensures that AS1 ’s view is
indistinguishable from its view in the real world execution.
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SimS2 simulates AS2 as following. It selects random
uˆ′1, uˆ
′
2 ∈ {0, 1}. It encrypts them into [uˆ′1]pkΣ , [uˆ′2]pkΣ , which
are sent to AS2 . If AS2 replies with ⊥, then SimS2 outputs
⊥. This is ensured in real world due to the IND-CPA security
of PCTD. In both real and ideal world, the views of AS2 are
indistinguishable. 
Theorem 2. The KET protocol is secure against the adver-
sary A∗ defined in the attack model.
Proof. The adversary A∗ is assumed to have the following
abilities.
(1) A∗ is assumed to be an outside adversary and eavesdrop
all the communications to get the transmitted informa-
tion. As A∗ is assumed to be an outside adversary, A∗
cannot get data owner A’s private key skA, data user
B’s private key skB and B’s authorization secret key
skΣ. A∗ also cannot get CP’s partial strong key SK1
and CSP’s partial strong key SK2.
If A∗ eavesdrops the communication channel between
the system user and CP, A∗ could get the ciphertexts
[X]pkA and [Y ]pkB that are transmitted at the begin-
ning of the KET protocol, and the encrypted result
[u∗]pkΣ that is transmitted at the end of the protocol.
Since [X]pkA , [Y ]pkB and [u
∗]pkΣ are encrypted using
the PCTD algorithm, the adversary A∗ cannot recover
X,Y, u∗ due to the IND-CPA security of PCTD.
If A∗ eavesdrops the communication channel between
CP and CSP, A∗ could get (l1, l′1, l2, l′2) in the end of
step 1, and ([u′1]pkΣ , [u
′
2]pkΣ) in the end of step 2. In
the KET protocol,
l1 = [γ1]pkΣ · [r3]pkΣ = [γ1 + r3]pkΣ ,
l2 = [γ2]pkΣ · [r4]pkΣ = [γ2 + r4]pkΣ ,
l′1 = PD1SK1(l1) and l
′
2 = PD1SK1(l2). Since the ad-
versary A∗ does know the data owner B’s authorization
secret key skΣ and the CSP’s partial strong key SK2,A∗
cannot recover the plaintexts γ1+ r3, γ2+ r4. Then, A∗
cannot deduce the plaintexts X , Y and their relationship.
(2) A∗ is assumed to compromise CP and get CP’s partial
strong key SK1. But A∗ cannot get CSP’s partial
strong key SK2. A∗ also cannot get data owner A’s
private key skA, data user B’s private key skB and B’s
authorization secret key skΣ.
In step 1 of the KET protocol, A∗ obtains [X]pkA
and [Y ]pkB from the data owner A and data user B.
A∗ cannot recover X nor Y without the secret keys
skA, skB . In step 3, A∗ obtains ([u′1]pkΣ , [u′2]pkΣ) from
CSP. Since skΣ is unknown, A∗ cannot derive (u′1, u′2).
(3) A∗ is assumed to compromise CSP and get CSP’s
partial strong key SK2. But A∗ cannot get CP’s partial
strong key SK1. A∗ also cannot get data owner A’s
private key skA, data user B’s private key skB and B’s
authorization secret key skΣ.
In step 2 of the KET protocol, A∗ obtains (l1, l′1, l2, l′2)
transmitted by CP. Since CSP’s partial strong key SK2
is known, A∗ decrypts
l′′1 = PD2SK2(l1, l
′
1) = γ1 + r3,
l′′2 = PD2SK2(l2, l
′
2) = γ2 + r4.
If L(l′′1 ) > L(N)/2, CSP sets u′1 = 0 and u′1 = 1
otherwise. If L(l′′2 ) > L(N)/2, CSP sets u′2 = 0 and
u′2 = 1 otherwise. Although A∗ can get γ1+r3, γ2+r4,
u′1 and u
′
2, A∗ cannot deduce the relationship of size
between X and Y . The reason is explained below.
In step 1, the CP flips random coins s1, s2 ∈ {0, 1} and
calculates ([γ1]pkΣ , [γ2]pkΣ) according to (s1, s2).
If s1 = 1,
[γ1]pkΣ = SAD(([X1]pkA)
r1 , ([Y1]pkB )
N−r1)
= [r1(X1 − Y1)]pkΣ .
If s1 = 0,
[γ1]pkΣ = SAD(([X1]pkA)
N−r1 , ([Y1]pkB )
r1)
= [r1(Y1 −X1)]pkΣ .
If s2 = 1,
[γ2]pkΣ = SAD(([X2]pkA)
N−r2 , ([Y2]pkB )
r2)
= [r2(Y2 −X2)]pkΣ .
If s2 = 0,
[γ2]pkΣ = SAD(([X2]pkA)
r2 , ([Y2]pkB )
N−r2)
= [r2(X2 − Y2)]pkΣ .
Then, the adversary A∗ gets
l′′1 = γ1 + r3 =
{
r1(X1 − Y1) + r3, if s1 = 1,
r1(Y1 −X1) + r3, if s1 = 0,
l′′2 = γ2 + r4 =
{
r2(Y2 −X2) + r4, if s2 = 1,
r2(X2 − Y2) + r4, if s2 = 0.
Due to the randomness of s1, s2, the adversary A∗
cannot deduce the relationship of size between X1 and
Y1, and that between X2 and Y2. Thus, A∗ cannot
deduce the relationship of size between X and Y .
(4) A∗ is assumed to be a set of collude malicious
users (B1, · · · , Bn) (except the challenge user B∗),
and A∗ gets their secret keys (skB1 , · · · , skBn). A∗
wants to get the information that belongs to the chal-
lenge user B∗. Suppose the compared ciphertexts are
([X]pkA , [Y ]pkB∗ ), and the returned result is [u
∗]pkΣ∗ ,
where pkΣ∗ is the authorize public key from data owner
A to challenge user B∗. Since the user’s secret keys are
independently generated, the adversary A∗ cannot utilize
(skB1 , · · · , skBn) to deduce the challenge user B∗’s
secret key skB∗ . A∗ also cannot get the authorization
secret key skΣ∗ . Thus, A∗ cannot recover Y nor u∗.
According to the above analysis, the KET protocol is secure
against the adversary A∗ defined in the attack model. 
Theorem 5. The MAX protocol proposed in Section IV-E is
secure to calculate the maximum encrypted data (with highest
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relevance score) on two encrypted ciphertext in the presence of
semi-honest (non-colluding) attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2).
Proof. We now construct the following independent simu-
lators (SimD1 , SimS1 , SimS2).
SimD1 receives tuples (I1, ID1,K1) and (I2, ID2,K2) as
input and simulates AD1 as following. It generates the ci-
phertext ([I1]pkΣ , [ID1]pkA , [K1]pkA) and ([I2]pkΣ , [ID2]pkB ,
[K2]pkB ). The entire view of AD1 is the received tuples and
the encrypted data. The IND-CPA security of PCTD ensures
that AD1 ’s view is indistinguishable from its view in the real
world execution.
SimS1 simulates AS1 as following. It randomly se-
lects (Iˆ1, ˆID1, Kˆ1) and (Iˆ2, ˆID2, Kˆ2) and encrypts them
into ([Iˆ1]pkΣ , [ ˆID1]pkA , [Kˆ1]pkA) and ([Iˆ2]pkΣ , [ ˆID2]pkB ,
[Kˆ2]pkB ). Then, it computes [Iˆ1]pkΣ = ([Iˆ1]pkΣ)
2 · [1]pkΣ ,
[Iˆ2]pkΣ = ([Iˆ2]pkΣ)
2. It flips a random coin s ∈ {0, 1}. If
s = 1, SimS1 computes Cˆ1, Cˆ2 using (1)-(2). Otherwise, it
computes Cˆ1, Cˆ2 using (5)-(6). According to the randomly
flipped coins s ∈ {0, 1}, it inputs ( ˆID1, ˆID2) and (Kˆ1, Kˆ2)
into SimSADS1 in Ref. [40] and gets Cˆ3, Cˆ4. Then, utilizing PD1
algorithm, it computes Cˆ ′1. It randomly selects αˆ ∈ {0, 1}
and computes [αˆ]pkΣ . It generates random ciphertext Cˆ6, Cˆ7.
According to the randomly flipped coins s ∈ {0, 1}, it inputs
them into SimSADS1 in Ref. [40] and gets [
ˆIDU ]pkΣ , [KˆU ]pkΣ .
Then, SimS1 sends (Cˆ1, Cˆ2, Cˆ3, Cˆ4, Cˆ
′
1) and the intermediate
encrypted data of SimSADS1 to AS1 . If AS1 replies with ⊥, then
SimS1 outputs ⊥. The IND-CPA security of PCTD ensures
that AD1 ’s view is indistinguishable from its view in the real
world execution.
SimS2 simulates AS2 as following. It selects random αˆ ∈
{0, 1}. If αˆ = 0, it calculates Cˆ5 = [0]pkΣ , Cˆ6 = [0]pkΣ ,
Cˆ7 = [0]pkΣ . If αˆ = 1, it generates random encryptions to
be (Cˆ5, Cˆ6, Cˆ7). For a certain αˆ, the generated ciphertexts are
computationally indistinguishable from the real world due to
the IND-CPA security of PCTD. In both real and ideal world,
the views of AS2 are indistinguishable. 
Theorem 6. The MAX protocol is secure against the adver-
sary A∗ defined in the attack model.
Proof. The adversary A∗ is assumed to have the following
abilities.
(1) A∗ is assumed to be an outside adversary and eavesdrop
all the communications to get the transmitted informa-
tion. As A∗ is assumed to be an outside adversary, A∗
cannot get data owner A’s private key skA, data user
B’s private key skB and B’s authorization secret key
skΣ. A∗ also cannot get CP’s partial strong key SK1
and CSP’s partial strong key SK2.
If A∗ eavesdrops the communication channel between
the system user and CP, A∗ could get the ciphertexts
TAi1 ,γj1 = ([Iγj1 ]pkΣ , [IDγj1 ]pkAi1
, [Kγj1 ]pkAi1
) and
TAi2 ,γj2 = ([Iγj2 ]pkΣ , [IDγj2 ]pkAi2
, [Kγj2 ]pkAi2
)
that are transmitted at the beginning of
the MAX protocol, and the encrypted result
TU = ([IU ]pkΣ , [IDU ]pkΣ , [KU ]pkΣ) that is transmitted
at the end of the protocol. Since TAi1 ,γj1 , TAi2 ,γj2
and TU are encrypted using the PCTD algorithm,
the adversary A∗ cannot recover (Iγj1 , IDγj1 ,Kγj1 ),
(Iγj2 , IDγj2 ,Kγj2 ) and (IU , IDU ,KU ) due to the
IND-CPA security of PCTD.
If A∗ eavesdrops the communication channel between
CP and CSP, A∗ could get (C ′1, C1, C2, C3, C4) in
the end of step 1, and ([α]pkΣ , C5, C6, C7) in the
end of step 2. In the MAX protocol, these ciphertexts
(C ′1, C1, C2, C3, C4, [α]pkΣ , C5, C6, C7) are all encrypt-
ed using the public key pkΣ. Since the adversary A∗
does know the data owner B’s authorization secret key
skΣ and the CSP’s partial strong key SK2, A∗ cannot
recover the underlying plaintexts.
(2) A∗ is assumed to compromise CP and get CP’s partial
strong key SK1. But A∗ cannot get CSP’s partial
strong key SK2. A∗ also cannot get data owner A’s
private key skA, data user B’s private key skB and B’s
authorization secret key skΣ.
In step 1 of the MAX protocol, A∗ obtains
TAi1 ,γj1 and TAi2 ,γj2 . A∗ cannot recover
(Iγj1 , IDγj1 ,Kγj1 ), (Iγj2 , IDγj2 ,Kγj2 ) without
the secret keys skΣ, skAi1 , skAi2 . In step 3, A∗ obtains
([α]pkΣ , C5, C6, C7) from CSP.
If s = 1,
[IU ]pkΣ
= [Iγj1 ]pkΣ · C5 · ([α]pkΣ)N−r2
=
{
[Iγj1 + (Iγj2 − Iγj1 + r2)− r2]pkΣ , if α = 1,
[Iγj1 + 0− 0]pkΣ , if α = 0,
=
{
[Iγj2 ]pkΣ , if α = 1,
[Iγj1 ]pkΣ , if α = 0,
[IDU ]pkΣ
= SAD([IDγj1 ]pkAi1 , C6) · ([α]pkΣ)
N−r3
=
{
[IDγj1 + (IDγj2 − IDγj1 + r3)− r3]pkΣ , if α = 1,
[IDγj1 + 0− 0]pkΣ , if α = 0,
=
{
[IDγj2 ]pkΣ , if α = 1,
[IDγj1 ]pkΣ , if α = 0,
[KU ]pkΣ
= SAD([Kγj1 ]pkAi1 , C7) · ([α]pkΣ)
N−r4
=
{
[Kγj1 + (Kγj2 −Kγj1 + r4)− r4]pkΣ , if α = 1,
[Kγj1 + 0− 0]pkΣ , if α = 0,
=
{
[Kγj2 ]pkΣ , if α = 1,
[Kγj1 ]pkΣ , if α = 0,
If s = 0,
[IU ]pkΣ
= [Iγj2 ]pkΣ · C5 · ([α]pkΣ)N−r2
=
{
[Iγj2 + (Iγj1 − Iγj2 + r2)− r2]pkΣ , if α = 1,
[Iγj2 + 0− 0]pkΣ , if α = 0,
=
{
[Iγj1 ]pkΣ , if α = 1,
[Iγj2 ]pkΣ , if α = 0,
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[IDU ]pkΣ
= SAD([IDγj2 ]pkAi1 , C6) · ([α]pkΣ)
N−r3
=
{
[IDγj2 + (IDγj1 − IDγj1 + r3)− r3]pkΣ , if α = 1,
[IDγj2 + 0− 0]pkΣ , if α = 0,
=
{
[IDγj1 ]pkΣ , if α = 1,
[IDγj2 ]pkΣ , if α = 0,
[KU ]pkΣ
= SAD([Kγj2 ]pkAi1 , C7) · ([α]pkΣ)
N−r4
=
{
[Kγj2 + (Kγj1 −Kγj2 + r4)− r4]pkΣ , if α = 1,
[Kγj2 + 0− 0]pkΣ , if α = 0,
=
{
[Kγj1 ]pkΣ , if α = 1,
[Kγj2 ]pkΣ , if α = 0,
Since α is unknown to CP, A∗ cannot decide the result
TU comes from TAi1 ,γj1 or TAi2 ,γj2 .
(3) A∗ is assumed to compromise CSP and get CSP’s
partial strong key SK2. But A∗ cannot get CP’s partial
strong key SK1. A∗ also cannot get data owner A’s
private key skA, data user B’s private key skB and B’s
authorization secret key skΣ.
In step 2 of the MAX protocol, A∗ obtains
(C ′1, C1, C2, C3, C4) transmitted by CP. Since A∗
knows CSP’s partial strong key SK2, A∗ decrypts
C ′′1 = PD2SK2(C1, C
′
1). If C
′′
1 < L(N)/2, CSP sets
α = 0 and computes
C5 = [0]pkΣ , C6 = [0]pkΣ , C7 = [0]pkΣ .
If C ′′1 > L(N)/2, CSP sets α = 1 and computes
C5 = CR(C2), C6 = CR(C3), C7 = CR(C4).
AlthoughA∗ can get the plaintext C ′′1 ,A∗ cannot deduce
the relationship of size between Iγj1 and Iγj2 . The
reason is explained below.
In step 1, the CP flips a random coins s ∈ {0, 1} and
calculates (C1, C2, C3, C4) according to s.
If s = 1,
C1 = [r1(I
′
γj1
− I ′γj2 ) + r
′
1]pkΣ ;
C2 = [Iγj2 − Iγj1 + r2]pkΣ ;
C3 = [IDγj2 − IDγj1 + r3]pkΣ ;
C4 = [Kγj2 −Kγj1 + r4]pkΣ .
If s = 0,
C1 = [r1(I
′
γj2
− I ′γj1 ) + r
′
1]pkΣ ;
C2 = [Iγj1 − Iγj2 + r2]pkΣ ;
C3 = [IDγj1 − IDγj2 + r3]pkΣ ;
C4 = [Kγj1 −Kγj2 + r4]pkΣ .
Then, the adversary A∗ gets
C1 =
{
[r1(I
′
γj1
− I ′γj2 ) + r
′
1]pkΣ , if s = 1,
[r1(I
′
γj2
− I ′γj1 ) + r
′
1]pkΣ , if s = 0,
C2 =
{
[Iγj2 − Iγj1 + r2]pkΣ , if s = 1,
[Iγj1 − Iγj2 + r2]pkΣ , if s = 0,
C3 =
{
[IDγj2 − IDγj1 + r3]pkΣ , if s = 1,
[IDγj1 − IDγj2 + r3]pkΣ , if s = 0,
C4 =
{
[Kγj2 −Kγj1 + r4]pkΣ , if s = 1,
[Kγj1 −Kγj2 + r4]pkΣ , if s = 0,
Due to the randomness of s, the adversary A∗ cannot
deduce the relationship of size between Iγj1 and Iγj2 .
(4) A∗ is assumed to be a set of collude malicious
users (B1, · · · , Bn) (except the challenge user B∗),
and A∗ gets their secret keys (skB1 , · · · , skBn). A∗
wants to get the information that belongs to the chal-
lenge user B∗. Suppose the returned result is TU =
([IU ]pkΣ∗ , [IDU ]pkΣ∗ , [KU ]pkΣ∗ ), where pkΣ∗ is the au-
thorize public key from data owner A to challenge user
B∗. Since the user’s secret keys are independently gener-
ated, the adversary A∗ cannot utilize (skB1 , · · · , skBn)
to deduce the challenge user B∗’s secret key skB∗ . A∗
also cannot get the authorization secret key skΣ∗ . Thus,
A∗ cannot recover (IU , IDU ,KU ).
According to the above analysis, the MAX protocol is secure
against the adversary A∗ defined in the attack model. 
Theorem 9. The Top-K protocol proposed in Section IV-E
is secure to calculate the top-k encrypted data (with highest
relevance scores) on encrypted ciphertext in the presence of
semi-honest (non-colluding) attackers A = (AD1 ,AS1 ,AS2).
Proof. We now construct the following independent simu-
lators (SimD1 , SimS1 , SimS2).
SimD1 receives tuples (Ii, IDi,Ki) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n as input
and simulates AD1 as following. It generates the ciphertext
(T1, · · · , Tn), where Ti = ([Ii]pkΣ , [IDi]pkA , [Ki]pkA) for
1 ≤ i ≤ n. The entire view of AD1 is the received tuples and
the encrypted data. The IND-CPA security of PCTD ensures
that AD1 ’s view is indistinguishable from its view in the real
world execution.
SimS1 simulates AS1 as following. It randomly
generates (T1, · · · , Tn) and inputs them into
SimMAXnS1 in Theorem 7 and gets TMAXi , where
TMAXi = 〈[IMAXi ]pkΣ , [IDMAXi ]pkΣ , [KMAXi ]pkΣ〉.
It inserts TMAXi into set Sa. SimS1 randomly selects
rj ∈ ZN , and inputs ([IDMAXi ]pkΣ)rj and (Tj,2)(N−rj)
into SimSADS1 in Ref. [40] and gets Vj . Then, SimS1 partially
decrypts Vj to V ′j = PD1SK1(Vj), and permutes (Vj , V
′
j )
using the permutation function pii. The result is denoted
as (Vpii(j), V
′
pii(j)
). SimS1 sends (Vpii(j), V
′
pii(j)
) and the
intermediate encrypted data of SimMAXnS1 and Sim
SMD
S1
to AS1 .
If AS1 replies with ⊥, then SimS1 outputs ⊥. The IND-CPA
security of PCTD ensures that AS1 ’s view is indistinguishable
from its view in the real world execution.
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SimS2 simulates AS2 as following. It randomly generates
ρ ∈R {0, 1}. If ρ = 0, it sets Apii(j) = [0]pkΣ ; otherwise,
it sets Apii(j) = [1]pkΣ . The generated ciphertexts Apii(j) is
computationally indistinguishable from the real world due to
the IND-CPA security of PCTD. In both real and ideal world,
the views of AS2 are indistinguishable. 
Theorem 10. The Top-K protocol is secure against the
adversary A∗ defined in the attack model.
Proof. The adversary A∗ is assumed to have the following
abilities.
(1) A∗ is assumed to be an outside adversary and eavesdrop
all the communications to get the transmitted informa-
tion. As A∗ is assumed to be an outside adversary, A∗
cannot get data owner A’s private key skA, data user
B’s private key skB and B’s authorization secret key
skΣ. A∗ also cannot get CP’s partial strong key SK1
and CSP’s partial strong key SK2.
If A∗ eavesdrops the communication channel between
the system user and CP, A∗ could get the ciphertexts
(T1, · · · , Tn) that are transmitted at the beginning of
the Top-K protocol, and the encrypted result Sa =
(TMAX1 , · · · , TMAXk) that is transmitted at the end of
the protocol, where Ti = 〈[Ii]pkΣ , [IDi]pkAi , [Ki]pkAi 〉.
Since (T1, · · · , Tn) and Sa are encrypted using the
PCTD algorithm, the adversary A∗ cannot recover
(Ii, IDi,Ki) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and the plaintext underlying
Sa due to the IND-CPA security of PCTD.
If A∗ eavesdrops the communication channel between
CP and CSP, A∗ could get (Vpii(j), V ′pii(j)) in line
8, and Apii(j) in line 14 of the Top-K protocol,
where Vj = SAD(([IDMAXi ]pkΣ)
rj , (Tj,2)
(N−rj)),
V ′j = PD1SK1(Vj) and Apii(j) = [0]pkΣ or Apii(j) =
[1]pkΣ . In the Top-K protocol, these ciphertexts
(Vpii(j), V
′
pii(j)
, Apii(j)) are all encrypted using the public
key pkΣ. Since the adversary A∗ does know the data
owner B’s authorization secret key skΣ and the CSP’s
partial strong key SK2, A∗ cannot recover the underly-
ing plaintexts.
(2) A∗ is assumed to compromise CP and get CP’s partial
strong key SK1. But A∗ cannot get CSP’s partial
strong key SK2. A∗ also cannot get data owner A’s
private key skA, data user B’s private key skB and B’s
authorization secret key skΣ.
In line 6 of the Top-K protocol, A∗ obtains
Vj = SAD(([IDMAXi ]pkΣ)
rj , (Tj,2)
(N−rj))
= SAD(([IDMAXi ]pkΣ)
rj , [IDj ]
(N−rj)
pkAj
)
= [rj(IDMAXi − IDj)]pkΣ
A∗ cannot recover rj(IDMAXi − IDj) without the
secret key skΣ. In line 14, A∗ obtains Apii(j) from CSP,
where
Apii(j) =
{
[0]pkΣ , if βj = 0,
[1]pkΣ , otherwise.
Since βj and skΣ are unknown to CP, A∗ cannot get the
plaintext of Apii(j) nor distinguish TMAXi comes from
which element in (T1, · · · , Tn).
(3) A∗ is assumed to compromise CSP and get CSP’s
partial strong key SK2. But A∗ cannot get CP’s partial
strong key SK1. A∗ also cannot get data owner A’s
private key skA, data user B’s private key skB and B’s
authorization secret key skΣ.
In line 8 of the Top-K protocol, A∗ obtains
(Vpii(j), V
′
pii(j)
) transmitted by CP. Since A∗ knows
CSP’s partial strong key SK2, A∗ decrypts
V ′′pii(j) = PD2SK2(Vpii(j), V
′
pii(j)
)
= rpii(j)(IDMAXi − IDpii(j))
Although A∗ knows whether rpii(j)(IDMAXi−IDpii(j))
equals 0, the adversary A∗ cannot distinguish IDpii(j)
comes from which element in (ID1, · · · , IDn). The rea-
son is that CP utilizes a permutation function pii to dis-
rupt the order of (V1, · · · , Vn) and (V ′1 , · · · , V ′n) in line
8 of the Top-K protocol. Thus, A∗ cannot distinguish
TMAXi comes from which element in (T1, · · · , Tn).
(4) A∗ is assumed to be a set of collude malicious
users (B1, · · · , Bn) (except the challenge user B∗),
and A∗ gets their secret keys (skB1 , · · · , skBn).
A∗ wants to get the information that belongs to
the challenge user B∗. Suppose the returned result
is Sa = {TMAX1 , · · · , TMAXk} that is transmit-
ted at the end of the protocol, where TMAXi =
〈[IMAXi ]pkΣ∗ , [IDMAXi ]pkΣ∗ , [KMAXi ]pkΣ∗ 〉 for 1 ≤
i ≤ k, and pkΣ∗ is the authorize public key from data
owner A to challenge user B∗. Since the user’s secret
keys are independently generated, the adversary A∗
cannot utilize (skB1 , · · · , skBn) to deduce the challenge
user B∗’s secret key skB∗ . A∗ also cannot get the
authorization secret key skΣ∗ . Thus, A∗ cannot recover
(IMAXi , IDMAXi ,KMAXi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
According to the above analysis, the Top-K protocol is
secure against the adversary A∗ defined in the attack model. 
